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Society of the Instance
by Alan Shapiro
pdf (52 Kb)
The entire virtual life of societies in which postcapitalist
conditions of seduction prevail presents itself as an immense
accumulation of software instances. Everything that was previously
either venerated or rejected in the fixated mirror stage by the
ideologically constituted ego as fetish system of commodities,
structurally sustaining panoply of consumer objects, or imposing
spectacle of images has dissolved away into an uncharted virtual
reality of the real time instantiation (or permutable, momentary
actualization) of modeled and coded, flexible, extensible, beautiful
software "objects." My investigation must therefore
begin with the analysis of a software instance, and the process
of instantiation into an (objectless) "object" (little
unit of distributed artificial intelligence) of what is known
in the theory and cultural practice of object-oriented programming
as a software class.
Object technology today embraces everything from object-oriented
languages and engineering methods, object-oriented databases,
and distributed communications middleware for the Object Web (standardized
CORBA / Java or Microsoft's Component Object Model) to the Unified
Modeling Language project spearheaded by Rational Software Corp.,
integrated development environments for building Windows applications
like Delphi and Visual C++, moving world 3D graphics authoring
systems, and advanced MIT Media Lab research in AI, nano-wearable
computing, autonomous agents, and artificial life. The new object-oriented
technology, however, is not just a burgeoning movement for greater
elegance and efficiency within the software industry. It is also
an energetic tendency influencing and thoroughly reshaping all
of globalizing, contemporary culture, as well as social and individual
existence. The "postconsumerist" multimedia software
instance - with its instantaneous (complementary to instantiating)
hyperlinks; its intensification of visual, windowed information;
and its multiple, effortlessly inter-translatable "tracks"
all rendered from the same transmitted stream of digital bits
(Negroponte, Being Digital) - is the emblematic software
object of this current trend of affairs. Informatics must thus
be viewed simultaneously from within as a neo-science or professional
practice, and from without as the principal transformative cultural
(and epistemological) force of our times.
Within the hyper-ascendent trajectory of the pragmatic employment
of computers and software, object-orientation (along with other
great innovations of the personal computer revolution, such as
interactive graphics or PCs as communications media) has been
a huge benefit and a source of vastly improved useability. As
compared with the earlier imperative, functional, and procedural
methodologies of computer science and software development, object-orientation,
considered "from the inside" (from a vocational standpoint),
plainly brings its practitioners into closer contact with the
dynamic processes of the "real world." Considered "from
the outside," however (from the standpoint of discerning
the philosophical and cultural effects of object technology),
the operation of carrying over the realist conception of a consensus-ordained,
observable, external reality from classical, natural science to
computer systems - which are virtual, not physical - is something
I regard as highly spurious and seek to place into question. Looked
at from a "business" point of view, object-orientation
clearly lifts professional programmers up to a loftier vantage
point from which they can construct systems which are not only
more robust and less costly, but which either more accurately
emulate already existing non-virtual systems which they are intended
to automate, or more prolifically implement new applications which
have been inspired solely by the digital imagination and its creative
tools.
Procedural programming combined the imperative (computer as executor
of sequential instructions) and functional (computer as calculator
of mathematical values) approaches into a unified technique whose
advantage was its capacity to break down large, complex requirements
or tasks into smaller, more manageable parts. The basic modular
component of a classic procedural programming language like C,
known as a "function," is both imperative and functional.
In C, a function (equivalent to a procedure or function in Pascal)
both carries out a succession of operations, and returns a computed
value to its calling function. As a "problem-oriented"
language, however, C remains a dialect(ic) of the (scientific)
Enlightenment, a final, release compilation of the rationalist-empiricist
epistème of Bacon, Newton, Descartes, and Leibniz.
Unlike its object-oriented successor C++, C is obliged to maintain
an unyielding separation between data (data structures) and the
computing functions which operate on that data. This is precisely
because the designers of the C programming language (Kernighan
and Ritchie), or of the Pascal programming language (Niklaus Wirth),
were not able to think about the crucial problem of code reusability
in any terms beyond the logic of binary opposition between the
"subject" process of the executing thread (identified
by projection with the computer scientist herself) and the already
written, reusable pieces of code which are "not the subject."
The subject thread temporarily relinquishes its control over program
execution to reusable code modules which are conceived in the
very image or reflection of the scientist-subject. These helper
routines or function libraries are delegations or extensions of
the scientist's "purposive-rational intelligence," her
problem-solving, data-obtaining capabilities. The archetypal scientific
subject empirically observes and analyzes the external, natural
world with the aim of "acquiring data" about it, and
then either generalizing towards the attainment of Enlightening
knowledge or interpreting the data in the Light of verifiable
or refutable theories and hypotheses. Data is a significant goal,
and the computer is an essential tool which assists in its procurement.
Given the Cartesian epistème's stringent dichotomization
with regard to things between the "is" and the "is
not" (Leibniz's universal combinatorics of the applied binary
code) or between the self-assured cogito and the self-evidence
of the physical world, data could never be a constituent part
of the fundamental building blocks of any representational or
computational system dependent on this paradigm. Data could only
be something which is "passed" back and forth among
the system's core compositional units (the functions), or which
is conceived as residing in input and output data structures which
get reconciled in a supplementary "data mapping." The
conceptualization of code and data as inseparable, integral aspects
of an intrinsic, indispensable, cohesive entity called the "software
object" necessitated the abandonment and going beyond of
the Weltanschauung of empirical, binary, subject-object-based,
reality-promoting science.
At a certain indeterminate (Canetti) point in its history, science
shifts from making use of a physical model of the universe to
making use of a virtual model, from the "original" mission
of "getting closer to" and upholding reality to adopting
an agenda of strengthening and promoting virtuality. Such a major
about-face in a knowledge system is only feasible, of course,
because the effectuated transmutation is the outcome of a subtle,
always already present, immanent reversibility. The unexpected
flip is provoked by the teasing out of potentialities which were
inherent within the system in its "original" configuration,
and which new circumstances have summoned to the fore (in this
case, the post-1968 social climate in the West which engendered
the retooling of survival strategies of postcapitalist seductive
power). In the empty, penumbral center of the momentous inversion
of realist science into virtualist science stand the magisterial
adventures of computer science, the emanation of the software
instance, and the spreading, omnipresent machinery of (multimedia,
windowed, information-concentrating) instantiation. The object-oriented
(computer) scientist is no longer an observer and data analyst
of the physical world, but is a designer and builder of anamorphic,
virtual worlds.
From the perspective of the cultural and cognitive consequences
of object technology (rather than from a strictly vocational perspective),
the greater efficacy enabled by the new paradigm is a double movement
(of reversibility) concurrently both closer to and away from "the
real." Object-orientation's true merit is relative: it is
a great thing for computers, whose serviceability it enhances
considerably in comparison with what computers were before. Object-orientation
is, however, not necessarily such a great thing for reality, since
its spiraling appeal and potency cause more and more aspects of
life to be brought daemonically under the sway of instantiating
computers and the reign of the multimedia instance. The gesture
"towards the real" within the double reverse movement
of object-orientation is perceptibly self-contradictory and self-sabotaging,
even though it appears at first glance only to be ambivalent.
On the one hand, this directional vector "towards the real"
is partly and frequently dressed up as a matter-of-fact claim
about increased apperception and faithful representation of reality.
It is a duplicitous gambit which continues to cash in on the still-paying
dividends or rhetorical remainders of the self-evident "scientific
real" left over from the very rationalist-empiricist epistème
which the partner motion "away from the real" (exemplified
in the concept of the "software class") seeks to subvert.
On the other hand, the distributed software object is partly
and frequently lauded for its proximity to reality according to
the ways of seeing and cheery virtues of a new (post)simulationist,
neo-Platonist epistème. Presented within this fresh (Platonist)
framework, the idea of the software object hinges directly on
the metaphor of already familiar, existing physical and social
objects. Object-orientation is an approach which appears to encourage
the intellectual and artistic elaboration in the design process
of cybernetic or quasi-structuralist "models of reality."
What I wish to demonstrate is that the misperception of the twofold
simultaneous movement "towards the real" and "away
from the real" as an apparent ambivalence rather than a contradiction
(hiding the possibility of immanent reversal) is due merely to
muddled dereliction in sorting out the locations and maneuvers
of the two respective epistémes. The neo-Platonist move
"away from the real" is rhetorically disguised, thanks
to the legacy of scientific rationalism and its seductive force,
as an element of concretion belonging to the move "towards
the real." The postcapitalist system withholds its potential
for liberatory, human-chosen, seminal reversibility by short-circuiting
each of its vectors at a limit point into its opposite (the motion
"towards the real" - towards the "play of appearances"
of the revivified object - flips into virtuality; the motion "away
from the real" flips into the modeling, cartographic, simulational,
computer-assisted real). However, the double movement at the heart
of this procedure remains self-contesting. At the same time, it
both depends upon and progressively undermines rationalist-empiricism's
residual assumption that reality always remains intact, no matter
what new, pernicious cultural operation is brought to bear upon
it.
Two of the key conceptual innovations of object-oriented methodology
are the software class and the software object. The central notion
of software class is defined as an abstraction of the common properties
of like things. The class of trees, for example, is designed to
encapsulate both the attributes and operations (data members and
function members, in the terminology of the C++ programming language;
fields and methods in the terminology of Java development) which
concern all trees (or at least those trees which are available
in a specific virtual worlds modeling environment). There may
then be descendent subclasses of the tree class, such as the beech,
myrtle, mahogany, pine, and cypress "families of trees"
classes, and yet further descendent subclasses of these intermediate
level classes. Each new derived subclass inherits characteristics
from another class which is one abstraction level higher in the
class hierarchy or chart, although these property inheritances
remain largely theoretical until the critical moment of object
instantiation. Fir, hemlock, larch, and spruce trees might be
examples of still more specialized classes which derive from the
pine tree family class. Redwood, incense cedar, and juniper tree
classes might derive in turn from the cypress tree family class.
A distributed software object which is instantiated as a "particular"
redwood tree - in a virtual reality Redwood National (Theme) Park
- might have some properties which are coded and maintained in
the class from which the software object is immediately instantiated
(the redwood tree class), other properties which are coded and
maintained in a class which is one level higher in the class hierarchy
(the cypress tree family class), and even further properties which
are coded and maintained in the base class of the class hierarchy
(the root nodal tree class). The base tree class, depending upon
the given system implementation, may itself be descendent from
an even more underlying and abstract base class with a name like
CWnd (Microsoft Foundation Class Library) or TForm (Object Pascal
or Delphi), denoting some fundamental element of the system, such
as, respectively, a (Windows) window or a screen dialog backdrop.
In actual simulation or modeling practice, interrelated groups
of software classes are conceptualized diagrammatically and in
multiple connections as part of a project-specific inheritance
ranking of classes and descendent subclasses which are deemed
to be suitable to the patterning and management of a distinct
environment, platform, or application domain. Targets of such
occupational, object-oriented, class diagram design might include
a graphical user interface operating system, a bank of elevators
in an office building, a four-dimensional texture mapped virtual
world, or the client-server transactional operations of a large
business enterprise.
In my arboreal hierarchy example, or tree (in the data structures
or diagram sense) of trees, the base class Tree might have the
attributes (data) of Color and TextLabel, and the operations (code)
of Draw and MakeRustlingNoise. The intermediate level class CyprusFamilyTree
might have the attributes of NumberOfCones and ConeType, and the
operations of Shake and Rotate. The most differentiated class
RedwoodTree might have the attributes of Height and TimberGrade,
and the operations of Protect and ChopDown. If I, the applications
programmer, then choose to create an instantiated software object
and call it MyRedwoodTree, I can then set the attributes of this
new software object (usually during, and as part of, the act of
instantiation) to MyRedwoodTree.Color = BrownishRed, MyRedwoodTree.TextLabel
= "Keep your hands off!," MyRedwoodTree.NumberOfCones
= 300, MyRedwoodTree.ConeType = Leathery, MyRedwoodTree.Height
= 200, and MyRedwoodTree.TimberGrade = Excellent. The result,
in my virtual world, of instantiating the software object and
setting these attribute values will be a redwood tree "instance"
which is brownish red, has a text label which reads "Keep
your hands off!," has 300 leathery cones, is 200 feet high,
and seductively attracts crowds of virtual lumberjacks. Similarly,
the software instance MyRedwoodTree can be programmatically manipulated
by calling the operations MyRedwoodTree.Draw (graphically renders
the tree), MyRedwoodTree.MakeRustlingNoise (plays a looping .WAV
file), MyRedwoodTree.Shake (stirs the tree in a specific cyprus
tree family manner), MyRedwoodTree.Rotate (turns the tree in a
specific cyprus tree family manner), MyRedwoodTree.Protect (activates
a killer force field around the virtual redwood tree), or MyRedwoodTree.ChopDown
(sacrifices the redwood tree to the timber industry).
The point of exhibiting all this detail is to rigorously nurture
my contention that the instantiated, distributed software object
has achieved a state of existence which is finally beyond the
logical Cartesian or classical, mathematical physics dualism between
the "is" and the "is not" (or even beyond
the discriminative categorization of the "this" and
the "that" - the modernist, Saussurian, proto-linguistic
system of arbitrary, positive differences among phonemes). A given
instantiated software object both "is" and "is
not" like another short-lived software object instantiated
from the same abstract parent classes. The same particular transient
software instance both "is" and "is not" like
the specification of attributes and operations coded and maintained
in each stratified, abstract class from which this software instance
gathers its behavior and conjoins its evanescent appearance.
Beyond a certain (im-precise) point in time, without realizing
it, object-orientation definitively transgressed the limits of
the discrete, binary, nominalist, symbolic logic which was the
"original" foundation of computing. The software instance,
as the basic (de)compositional unit of this new (post)simulative
system, enacts data- and context-specific performances of its
ancestor classes, at last unifying data and the operations on
that data into a single, self-contained entity. Initialized in
real time, and in precise circumstances of seduction for each
new occurrence, the distributed object coalesces its parameters
of existence "on the fly" from coded and maintained,
detailing and specifying, (de)constituting parts. Unlike binary
bits, which were the elementary particles of earlier, classical
computing, these latter-day class layered "elementary particles"
are undecidable and non-discrete to the core. The exp ress characteristics
conferred on the software object at the moment of its virtual
inception include the instance's attributes, operations, memory
state, inter-object messaging or event protocols, and associative
and aggregational relationships with other distributed objects.
With object-orientation, the problem of code reusability has been
rethought in an ingenious and much more pliable way. This very
suppleness, however, is also the secret mechanism of seductive
power in the newly upgraded, virtualizing cultural system.
The passing of messages and the responding to events are also
among the most important aspects of the behavior of software objects
in the object-oriented paradigm. The Windows operating system,
for example, is often discussed in terms of its "message-driven
architecture," and most Windows applications are structured
according to an "event-driven technique." Rather than
consisting of code which acts upon its surroundings and chooses
when to act in conformance with a self-driven interior logic (the
old procedural paradigm), the Windows program is a first-level
"command target" or message dispatcher which receives
messages from Windows (itself an instantiated cyber-environment),
parses them, and passes them along to the "window procedure"
or message map of the appropriate window object within the application.
Client area, component windows are themselves instantiated from
specialized window classes like 256-color bitmap buttons or multi-column
list boxes. A message intended for a designated child window might
be something like a forced repainting or user input from the keyboard.
The program sits idle much of the time, does its processing when
called upon, and then returns control back to multi-tasking Windows.
In the Unified Modeling Language, the message is the basic unit
of inter-object communication, and a message can only be sent
between two objects which have a named association. An event is
a type of message announcing a noteworthy occurrence. A message
almost always holds either data or control commands intended for
a target software object, but it can also contain "metadata"
furnishing, for example, network-demanded protocol information
about itself. Each (non-message) software object in a system specifies
and makes public its own distinctive messaging interface, thereby
signaling to other potentially communicating software objects
the handshaking procedures, obligatory precursor events, and methods
of message transfer which it supports. The inter-object message
is itself a kind of software object, since it is also instantiated
from abstract (message) classes, themselves enumerated in the
standardized UML metamodel as an elaborate hierarchy of specialized
synchronous, asynchronous, periodic, episodic, and bursty inter-object
message subclasses.(1) The networking
transport (layer) of software objects has also become the site
of a dense, painstaking formalization, with increasingly ornate
systems of message formatting, packeting, routing, prioritizing,
reliability, and reporting. Inter-object messaging (in a distributed
architecture) allows a software object to invoke an operation
belonging to another "fine-grained" software object
residing elsewhere on the network, and even leads to the going
beyond of the concept of boundaries between local and remote machines.
As messaging becomes even more prominent in distributed object
technologies (for example, in CORBA 3.0 with its new compatibility
with Message-Oriented Middleware), it is important to keep in
mind that message and transaction objects are varieties of instantiating
software object, and that their studied refinement only adds further
to the repetoire of virtualizing techniques available to multi-mediatized
culture and its relentless endo-colonization of lived experience.
The seventeenth century mathematician and philosopher G.W. Leibniz
is credited both with assembling a protocomputer arithmetic machine
which performed multiplication and division as well as addition
and subtraction, and with devising a new branch of mathematics
in his essay De Arte Combinatorica (1666). Leibniz followed
René Descartes in wanting to deduce a complete knowledge
system starting from a few basic tabula rasa principles of certainty.
Leibniz believed in a "universal character" or universal
logical language which someday would be inferentially constructed
step by step on the heels of the establishing of the correct first
propositions. For Leibniz, the selection of the quintessential
grounding axioms for the lingua franca system entailed the contriving
of a few absolutely requisite representational symbols for the
prime concepts, and a few absolutely requisite rules for combining
these symbols. Once the general system was successfully set up,
all existing or new scientific and cultural questions could then
be solved, according to Leibniz, by invoking the dictum "let
us calculate." This dream of applied mathematical certainty
was reinvigorated and pursued anew in the mid-nineteenth century
by the formal logician George Boole (the calculus of finite differences,
the algebra of logical reasoning), and in the early twentieth
century by logical positivist philosophers like Bertrand Russell
(the logical conclusions of first principle theorems for all of
mathematics, the logical conclusions of first principle atheism
for all of human beliefs). Leibniz's vision of an unrestricted
method of automatic ratiocination by calculation was then actualized
in the mid-twentieth century invention of the high speed digital
computer, which was first conceived in 1936 by Alan Turing and
Emil Post (in separate descriptions of code-driven, finite state
automata), and then built by John von Neumann and his University
of Pennsylvania Moore School Group colleagues during and immediately
after World War II.(2)
Since any specialized automaton (precursor of the software application)
could be delineated with a finite set of binary instructions,
argued Turing in his 1936 paper, "On Computable Numbers,
with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem," therefore
a universal automaton (precursor of computer hardware) could be
imagined which would exactly mimic the desired behavior of any
specialized automaton simply by cycling through those same instructions.(3)
In his book Turing's Man, J. David Bolter characterized the information
processing technique of a Universal Turing Machine as the replacement
of "discrete symbols one at a time according to a finite
set of rules." This "original" logic of computing
was firmly rooted in the dualism of the "is" and the
"is not" (the long strings of binary digits or 0s and
1s, the perfect "existential" weight of the discrete
identifiers). It still had rather strong ties to the old physical
model of reality (the substantiality of numbers, the switching
of registers and signals in both storage and processing), and
to the "certainty" - or identity with itself - of the
old scientific object.
Prior to the compelling appearance of "object technology"
in recent decades, computers were deeply and intricately associated
with the triumph and concretization of mathematical, symbolic
logic. As recently as 1984, the computer science and Classics
professor J. David Bolter was able to write - in apparent obliviousness
to the rise of object-orientation - that "every computer
program is the ... realization, the tangible proof, of a theorem
in logic ... every programmer ... is a logician with a theorem
to prove." If anything was certain concerning the status
of electronic digital thinking in the history of ideas, Bolter
asserted, it was that the land of the CPU and the fetch-and-execute
cycle is a kingdom from which God and religion are, without shadow
of doubt, excluded. "The unification envisioned by Plato"
- the ideal world of the Platonic Forms and Ideas, the "series
of perfect patterns from which the imperfect objects of the material
world" are derived - "has no counterpart in computerized
thought."(4)
With the great shift in the software development paradigm which
kicked into high gear in the nineties, from structured and procedural
programming languages (Fortran, ALGOL, Pascal, C) to object-oriented
languages (Smalltalk, Java, Delphi, C++), we have reversed from
the Cartesian subjectivism of Turing (computer as machine to imitate
the intelligence of the logician) and von Neumann (strict division
between the "subject" of program commands and the operated-upon
data) to the neo-Platonism of object-oriented luminaries like
Rational Software's Grady Booch (the diagrammatic modeling language
is the program code) and Xerox PARC's Smalltalk inventor Alan
Kay (the de-sensualization of children's play on the computer
screen depicted in glowing McLuhanesque terms as an "extension
of man"). In an ironic twist of fate, Western thought goes
back and slurps thirstily from the primal fount of Platonist metaphysics,
returning full circle to the favoring of the abstract ideality
of essences over the sentient reality of single case appearances,
to the disseminated purity of the "transcendental signifiers,"
to the systemically deferred, yet urgently required, attendance
of God.
The move against antinomies seems oddly to be refracted and paralleled
throughout all of postconsumerist, mainstream cyberculture. The
anti-Saussurian "raising of the bar" between paired
terms (signifier / signified) has led "merely" to the
decoupling of dualisms which turned out to belong to the time-bound,
"doomed" Enlightenment epistéme. The assault
on binary oppositions has cleared the way for newly emergent,
brilliantly resourceful persistence strategies on the part of
occidental metaphysics (postcapitalism). Object-orientation, with
its class hierarchies and virtual object instantiation, appears
to have introduced a "deconstructive Platonism" (Plato
revised by grammatology), a vast "production" of interminable,
subject-less "writing;" a layered, metonymic chain of
(re)valuation; a perpetually and recursively auto-substituting,
auto-supplementing, structured and seductive game of différance.
The virtual tree which I see outside the three-dimensional digital
video window (or screen) of my computerized car is no longer a
real tree. It culls together its existence from the (differentiating
and deferring) class hierarchy of trees. It both is and is not
a tree, because its différance has been put into play.
Object-orientation's strategem of entity generalization and concomitant
specification of instances is strikingly reminiscent of the Platonist
Realm of Forms and Plato's accompanying critique of merely technical
or representational copies which do not partake of the "Idea"
of the original. Software instantiation (de)institutes a temporary
relationship between an ordered ranking of software classes and
the created, then destroyed, software object which is a parameter-
and data-specified instance of those determining classes. In Platonist
terms of iconic likeness, a software instance would be regarded
as a legitimate resemblance rather than an illegitimate semblance
or simulacrum, even though the distributed software object is,
in a certain sense, inferior to the less tangible software class
due to the former's transitoriness. The significant contrast would
be between the system of classes / objects and its predecessor,
the classical "society of the spectacle" (or société
de consommation) system of lowly, imitative images.
In the section of The Republic entitled "How Representation
in Art is Related to Truth", Socrates sounds uncannily like
a guru of object-oriented design when he says: "Let us take
any common instance [!!]; there are beds and tables in the world
- plenty of them. But there are only two ideas or forms of them
- one the idea of a bed, the other of a table. And the maker of
either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in
accordance with the idea." Primary reality, for Plato, is
not to be sought in the empirical world of everyday things (ordinary
instances of beds or tables), but rather in the general, abstract
Forms (the divine idea of the bed or table) from which "concrete"
things are derived or fashioned. Socrates goes on in this passage
to say that there are three philosophical categories of b eds:
the idea of the bed (made by God), the instance of the bed (made
by a carpenter), and the imitation of the bed (made by a painter).
Concerning the question of how near or far each of the three categories
of beds is to the Ideal Forms of Beauty, Truth, and Excellence,
it is clear for Socrates that the idea of the bed is the closest
to these exalted virtues, the instance of the bed comes in as
a respectable second closest, and the imitation of the bed runs
a pitiful last - far removed from anything valuated as either
noble or good.
The Socratic dialogue in Politeia about mimesis is a contemptuous
critique and dismissal of (imitative) poetry and painting, which
only reproduce technical copies and are said to be "thrice
removed from the truth." Painting, for Socrates-Plato, is
a degraded art form of the semblance or mirror image, an aesthetic
activity which demands of the painter "no knowledge worth
mentioning," and no comprehension of "true existence."
Moreover, although it "may deceive children or simple persons,"
imitative painting comes up way short in its endeavor to fool
the majority of members of the polity into being placated by its
inauthentic, second-rate images. Media technologies of mere duplication
or representation are ultimately inadequate because they fail
as instruments of political superintendence. Object-orientation
is a new "artificial language" of seductive power (a
new system of virtualization) which curiously combines a Platonist
ingredient (transcendental signifiers or software classes) and
a deconstructionist ingredient (unending, undecidable, auto-referentially
recursive "discourse" in the hierarchical, (de)instituting,
subclassing chains).
In an interesting excursus on différance, Canadian cultural
theorist Gary Genosko isolates the disparity between Derrida's
and Baudrillard's anti-semiologies or respective critiques of
Saussure as located in a decisive difference in emphasis placed
on the "orders" of either value or signification. In
his examination of the Saussurian sign (in "Speech and Phenomena",
in Of Grammatology, and in the essay "Différance"),
Derrida focused on the negative "linguistic concept of difference
without positive terms," taking apart Saussure's (mistaken)
dualistic metaphysics of signifier and signified, and thus leading
to critical recognition of the impossibility of the sign's self-referential
unity or full presence to itself. The doubled, horizontal relationship
of value, which relies for its structuration on the sign's two
internal components (signifier and signified) and the bar between
them, is shown by Derrida to be a myth. By consequence, the vertical
relationship of signification - the bar between the sign as a
unified entity and what the sign excludes - must also be mythical.
Signification, which depends for its existence on the establishment
or "institution" of a positive plenitude of the sign,
is prematurely subsumed under value, which has already undergone
the negative critique of the subversive, differential play of
language. The edifice of signification is subordinated to the
foundation of value.(5) Once
the foundation fails, the building is - much too quickly - believed
to collapse along with it. The rapid stress applied by Derrida
to the bar of value both denies to signification the operational
preconditions for its critical (and fatal) scrutiny, and underestimates
the intractability of the auto-rectifying, re-complexing, continually
morphing, positive sign. The negative critique of the transcendental
signifiers is an auto-proliferating, contiguous, reiterative critique
which bypasses the otherness of both subjects and objects. It
turns one in a direction away from any enduring, ironic, sacrificial
engagement with the eighteen-headed hydra of signification or
the simulacra.
Object-oriented software engineering and multimedia design (in
their prevalent forms) are languages for the streamlining, administration,
control, and substitution of human experience. As a cybernetic,
"artificial language" (human languages were always artificial,
of course), object-orientation has profited a great deal from
its in-depth familiarity with "so-called natural languages."
It is keenly aware of the (negative) différance which Derrida
in some sense claims to be a force or quality possessed by all
languages which is subversive of metaphysics. In order to devise
an "artificial language" of decentralized control or
regulation of the quotidian, it helps to know a lot about the
functioning of the "revaluation or dislocation chains"
of human languages. Seductive power is also exercized all the
more efficaciously after language has been transferred to an electronic,
cyber arena, where it becomes more "programmable" than
ever before. Software classes (the Platonist pole of the system),
however, are "reconciled" signifiers (they are not,
in turn, signifieds of yet more signifiers, and so on ad infinitum).
They are the system's closure points, the limits to the free play
of discourse, and the very stipulations for virtuality. After
the menacing "subjective" unrest of 1968 (which continued
well into the seventies), the subject-object system of "mere
images" (Plato's simulacra), technologies of representation,
and clear separation between viewer and viewed (or between consumer
and artistic product) was judged to be insufficient for the preservation
of the polis. The metaphysical tradition was then renovated and
renewed.
In the early years, I was submerged by a governing spectacle
or consumer society - a "system of objects" categorized
collection which had not yet blossomed into a consummated system
of distributed (temporally deferred and differentiated) objects,
not yet become a language. Baudrillard paused for a long moment
to contemplate the specific weight or unity of the socio-cultural
sign in its methodical, signifying logic or "semiological
reduction" of ambivalence, reciprocity, and sensuality. The
sign, in its wholeness, was still structured in vintage consumer
society according to a taxonomy of positive, "arbitrary"
differences from other sign-objects (within the Saussurian, modernist,
cybernetic-operational, Cartesian epistème). After this prolonged
hesitation Baudrillard moved on to his own, more deliberate, long-term
project of "deconstruction" or prying apart of the signified-signifier
relation into the denominator of simulation models and the numerator
of the (fourth-order) simulacra or pure, crystalline objects.
The early emphasis in Baudrillard was on the stability of the
sign in its positive configuration, the ruling semiocracy, or
the collective, autoerotic perversion and "passion for the
code" which institutes a serialized social "cohesiveness,"
and is opposed en bloc to the suppressed anthropological principle
of symbolic exchange. "To become an object of consumption,
an object must first become a sign ... it is thus arbitrary ...
it derives its consistency, and hence its meaning, from an abstract
and systematic relationship to all other sign-objects." In
the vertical order of signification of the (not yet distributed)
system of objects, difference is still organized on the level
of undivided signs, in the bar of separation between the coded
abstraction of the joined signifier / signified and that which
this "ideological unity" radically exiles (Bataille's
sumptuary expenditure or Mauss' potlatch and obligatory gift exchanges).
In the self-endorsing mass media of "speech without response,"
what is sold to "consumers" with each advertising message
or replicated image is not a particular product, but rather the
system of abundance and diaphanous communication in its entirety,
the order of signs itself. "Without 'believing' in the product,
therefore, we believe in the advertising that tries to get us
to believe in it."(6)
The special and technical speed-effects of the broadcasting electronic
medium overwhelm the content or real events which the medium is
naively believed to beneficently bring into relief or report on.
This inversion of message and medium brings about the most non-obvious,
yet most insidious, kind of manufacturing of pseudo-event. "Substitution
of a 'neo-real' for 'the real' is occurring everywhere, produced
as a whole based on the combination of the elements of the code.
In the wide spectrum of daily life, an immense simulation process
is taking place, in the image of the 'simulation models' on which
the operational and cybernetic sciences are working." The
generalized code - now understood in the sense of a flexible re-combinatorics
of the broken down, unraveled, most elementary particles or units
of something real, as well as in the "anti-semiological"
sense - takes the place of the fading signified or referent (in
its classic form).(7) In L'Échange
symbolique et la mort (1976), this insight into the workings
of what Baudrillard calls the "third-order simulacra"
develops into a full-scale commentary on "the metaphysics
of the code" - the obsession with genetic information (DNA)
and its affiliated, "micro-molecular" command and control
sequence-transcription dialects as the new definitional matrices
of life and reality.
What opened the door for the notion of simulation was the pressure
which Baudrillard applied to the signified (or referent), in the
first of two moves (the second being the move from the signifier
to the fourth-order simulacra of potentially reversible, "accursed
share" objects) leading to the dismantling of the "doubly
uneven" sign. Baudrillard pulls the thread of simulation
from the sign-spindle's fragile, tapered end (the signified),
and keeps on pulling. Since capitalism relies so much on the instrumentalizing
equivalence of exchange-values and on the dynamic, charismatic
allure of continually mutating signifiers, use-values and signifieds
recline into a reduced ideological status as orbiting satellites,
justifying alibis, or retrograde "security deposits"
(des cautions) of the former terms (exchange-values and signifiers).
Needs are posited as "rational" and "natural"
finalities by the consumer system, but they are, in fact, insatiable
"desiring symptoms," tautologically projected by the
"personalizing" signification and selling process itself.
Reality and lived experience (le vécu) lose their standing
as self-evident, objective references, and are substituted by
"reality-effects" and "live-effects" which
the signifiers still require for collateral purposes of legitimation
and fresh data input. The "structural revolution of value,"
as it is called in L'Échange symbolique et la mort,
has completely unhinged the sign from its referent. It has left
the emasculated signified in a state of relative enfeeblement
whose apprehension is still partly obscured by both the rote trumpeting
of Enlightenment virtues and by the downright celebration of simulation.
The reconstitution of a thing based only on its information is
just what the doctor ordered for a society bent on cultivating
its ability to allow individuals to live alone in ostensible safety,
while simulating a life of rich experiences (interactions with
the enchanting, technical twins of other people and the world).
History (which was perhaps always a simulation model), for example,
is shattered to bits by the celluloid, tape recorder, and document
stockpiling apperception of events (L'illusion de la fin).
From within a culture of simulation, as is our situation, claims
of cognitive or hermeneutical access to antecedent "real
history" can no longer be verified or sustained. Memories
of the Vietnam War are replaced by memories of Hollywood movies
about the Vietnam War. Referential substance and "truth"
are everywhere replaced by a superabundance of information and
data. Ordinary reality is replaced by the permanent buzz of "entertainment"
- the eternally recurrent, stereotypical hyperreality of television
and of all the Disneylands.
Simulation of the body in plastic surgery, bodybuilding, cosmetics,
and "beam me up, Scotty." Simulation of thinking in
artificial intelligence. Simulation of sexuality and desire in
pornography. The end of war in the Pentagon's video game virtual
war machine. The end of linear time in the no-time of real time,
and in the retroactivity and turbulence of time travel. The end
of aesthetic illusion in the holodeck, and in neural-direct and
helmet-and-glove VR systems. The end of communication in the over-proximity
and ubiquitous connections of telecommunications. The end of fiction
(and its opposite, reality) in "science fiction" films
which only publicize and disseminate the newly arriving digital
technologies and their prescribed living conditions. The end of
the referent of human beings in the will to build a technical,
immortal replacement species. These simulation systems are assemblages
belonging to the "third-order simulacra" - mongrel,
duplex contraptions where the signified (catalyzed by a dose of
"fatal theory") has absorbed all of the energy of its
signifier into itself, thus generating a parodic and bloated "exorbitant"
version of what it already was. But compartmentalized American
thought sees nothing to be troubled by in any of this. Plastic
surgery is a signifier of the body or of social success. An inner
ear cellular phone implant is a signifier of connectivity. A nano-cartridge
memory implant is a signifier of my freedom to lie (to myself).
Campbell's Soup cans are a signifier of soup - and that's that.
This "Californian" hyper-pragmatism of the bi-structured
sign is a single-minded lucidity of the technological agent and
its purposive ends. Its ideological resiliency serves as a poignant
reminder of the prestigious and prodigious ground still shared
between the third-order, cybernetic, combinatorial, "mode
of information" codes and Enlightenment-rationalist science.
Considered from an "anti-sociology of knowledge" point
of view, simulation systems still suffer from the preeminent malady
of the long era of the classical scientific epistème: the
prevailing illusion that the world is not an illusion, or the
epochal nullification of what Baudrillard calls "the vital
illusion, the radical illusion of the world."(8)
Science has always insisted on an unwavering identity of the object
with the object - on the pinning down of a fixed, determined object
in its material (or informational, transcribed) constancy. This
predilection of science has effectively concealed the absence
of things from themselves, the fact of their differentiated and
temporally deferred "incarnations," the fact of their
non-immediacy, and the seductive play of their appearances.
So-called "primitive" societies, as Baudrillard and
others have often pointed out, had a different (more symbolic,
reciprocal, and creative) relation to the problem of the truth
or reality of this world - a question which Western society resolved
through technical simulation. With instantiation and the software
instance - with a certain artistic practice which they invite
- the opportunity to recover (or reverse) what Paul Virilio calls
"the aesthetics of disappearance" comes into view. It
is the excess of information, inaugurated by the postcapitalist
cultural system itself, which provokes the "objectlessness"
of the object, the apparition of the object which is not an object:
the software object. Here lies the possibility of a fully original
anthropological moment (the flip of the software instance into
the Nietzschean play of appearances), and the potential contestation
of the scientific worldview.
The "interface" of a human to the world (a relationship
which should respect that which makes the world, or an object,
indifferent towards me) - this contact area of illusion or "fiction"
is, properly speaking, the territory of the signifiers. After
the signifieds have been cleared out of the way (they imploded
as simulation systems), Baudrillard is free to undertake his second
move in the strategic divestiture of semiology - a step which
will complete the supplanting of the object as structural sign
by the object as pure sign. This is a creative and proactive -
yet "non-subjective" - involvement with new "signifiers."
In a gesture which is at once political (though without attracting
power) and (post)aesthetic, Baudrillard returns to his original
passion for (the system of) objects, but this time in a meditation
on "pure objects" (as well as "pure events"
and "pure images"). These new "evil genius"
objects, born of the system's exorcistic and excessive processes,
unknowable through their information, shaped in their superficial
and empty molds as "unconditional simulacra," are the
carriers of irony and shrewd indifference. Images were denigrated
and expelled from the "body politic" by Plato, and they
are again today - their singularity rolled over like subliminal
cannon fodder in high-speed, windowed, multi-component instantiations.
The dizzying qualities of these object-oriented instances start
to resemble the "aleatory giddiness" which Roger Caillois,
in Les jeux et les hommes (1958), saw as characteristic
of the ethnographically archetypal game forms of chance and vertigo
which, as with gambling, are now making their comeback.
I identify the post-1968 dominant cultural strategy of object-oriented
cyberspace as the construction of a new signification system,
erected on the scaffolding of the previous one. As far as mainstream
cyberculture is concerned, this transition from the third- to
the fourth-order simulacra can be summed up by the formula: Simulation
plus Différance equals Virtuality. The deconstructionist
boxer struck a forceful blow against the Cartesian epistéme.
This arching jab turned out, however, merely to be one of the
best video replay highlights for the recombinant resource database,
to be used in the prize fight promoter's overall scheme for the
differentiated distribution of the spectacle onto every screen
and holographic living room table in town.
Plato's metaphysics of reality proclaimed a tripartite structure,
posed on the equilibrium between (for example) the divine idea
of the table (the transcendental signifier) and the supposed "real"
exemplification of the table produced by the carpenter (the transcendental
signified), to the double exclusion of the image created by the
painter. The stability of this system has already been shaking
for quite some time. The software classes of object-oriented programming
are a symptom of this loss of steadiness. Software classes are
relatives both of the "reconciled" signifiers and of
the "reconciled" signifieds (related to the positive
structuralist-semiotic sign), but they are also one step further
along in simulation. With the progressive withering of referents,
the "rock solid" instances of the carpenter's workbench
evanesce into the conceptual abstractions (based on design and
memory) which will generate virtual software instances. The software
classes are the post-simulationist remains of (references to)
reality, and they become a basic unit of the new virtualizing
system. Transcendental signifier of the tree class, declared by
the programmer, (de)coupled with the transcendental signified
of trees "in reality" which he remembers, on whose memory
this system survives, but which will not be around for long.
To accomplish the system of virtuality which is starting to reign
around the globe today, the signifieds (the references to "reality")
must also be dispersed, distributed, put through the work of differentiation,
phonemically and temporally processed by what is alternatively
called either linguistic deconstruction or the software subclassing
hierarchies. The differential move is the limitless, extreme,
free play of fourth-order simulacra - an entropic, friction-free,
fractal "chaos" of (re)valuation. Différance,
however, is only half of the equation's left side. The paradoxical,
hybrid system (simulation plus différance equals virtuality)
is simultaneously postcapitalism's temporary salvation and its
fast burnout (its desperate reform). In spite of its extraordinary
charisma and seductive powers, instantiation is in a much more
precarious position than any of its predecessors in the history
of capitalism (alienation, reification, simulation). The software
instance relies on transcendental signifieds (trees) which will
soon disappear, and on transcendental signifiers (the idea of
trees) which will quickly follow into extinction. It also relies
on the differential qualities of language, which it will soon
exhaust as well.
Notes
1 - Bruce Powel Douglass, Real-Time UML: Developing
Efficient Objects for Embedded Systems (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1998); pp.25,56-61. [back]
2 - Herman H. Goldstine, The Computer: from
Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton University Press, 1972).
[back]
3 - The Computer: from Pascal to von Neumann;
pp.274-75. [back]
4 - J. David Bolter, Turing's Man: Western
Culture in the Computer Age (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1984); pp.22, 47, 77-79. [back]
5 - Gary Genosko, Baudrillard and Signs: Signification
Ablaze (London: Routledge, 1994); pp. 18-24. [back]
6 - Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects
(translated by James Benedict) (London: Verso, 1996) (originally
published by Éditions Gallimard in 1968); pp.166,200. [back]
7 - Baudrillard, La Société
de consommation: ses mythes, ses structures (Paris: DenoÎl,
1970); pp.194-96. [back]
8 - Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime (translated
by Chris Turner) (London: Verso, 1996). [back]
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